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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Christina Williams and Michael Stermel (“Plaintiffs”) 
obtained loans from AWL, Inc., an online entity owned by the 
Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians (“Tribe”).  Plaintiffs assert 
that AWL charged unlawfully high interest rates and sued 
AWL’s holding company, Red Stone, Inc., and three members 
of AWL’s board of directors, Mark Curry, Vincent Ney, and 
Brian McGowan (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of 
federal and Pennsylvania law.  Defendants moved to compel 
arbitration.  The District Court denied their motion, holding 
that the loan agreements—which provided that only tribal law 
would apply in arbitration—stripped Plaintiffs of their right to 
assert statutory claims and were therefore unenforceable.  
Because AWL permits borrowers to raise disputes in 
arbitration only under tribal law, and such a limitation 
constitutes a prospective waiver of statutory rights, its 
arbitration agreement violates public policy and is therefore 
unenforceable.  As a result, the District Court correctly denied 






 Plaintiffs entered into payday loan agreements with 
 
1 Because Defendants moved to compel arbitration 
based on the face of the complaint and the documents relied 
upon, and because the District Court did not order discovery 
and instead relied only on the pleadings, we draw the facts from 
Plaintiffs’ complaint.  See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt 
Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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AWL.  “Payday loans are ostensibly short-term cash advances 
for people who face unexpected obligations or emergencies,” 
“typically for small sums” and “to be repaid quickly.”  Gingras 
v. Think Fin., Inc., 922 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 856 (2020).   
 
 To obtain loans from AWL, Plaintiffs had to sign a loan 
agreement that set forth the interest rates, payment terms, and 
other provisions.2  The loan agreement states that it “is between 
you, as borrower/debtor, and AWL, Inc., an arm of [the Tribe], 
as lender,” J.A. 280, and includes the following 
“IMPORTANT DISCLOSURE” to the borrower: 
 
YOU AGREE THAT THIS LOAN IS MADE 
WITHIN THE TRIBE’S JURISDICTION AND 
IS SUBJECT TO AND GOVERNED BY 
TRIBAL LAW[3] AND NOT THE LAW OF 
YOUR RESIDENT STATE.  IN MAKING 
THIS LOAN, YOU CONSENT TO TRIBAL 
JURISDICTION FOR THIS LOAN.  YOUR 
RESIDENT STATE LAW MAY HAVE 
INTEREST RATE LIMITS AND OTHER 
CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS 
THAT ARE MORE FAVORABLE.  IF YOU 
 
2 The three loan agreements at issue in this case (two by 
Williams and one by Stermel) are identical, save the principal, 
which ranged from $1000-$1600, and annual percentage 
interest rates, which ranged from 496.55% to 714.88%, J.A. 
35-37, so we will refer to the three agreements as one.   
3 The loan agreement defines “Tribal Law” as “any law 




WISH TO HAVE YOUR RESIDENT STATE 
LAW APPLY TO ANY LOAN THAT YOU 
TAKE OUT, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER 
TAKING A LOAN FROM A LICENSED 
LENDER IN YOUR STATE. 
J.A. 280 (capitalization in original).4  The loan agreement also 
makes disclosures pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, but 
states that “we do not concede that the Truth in Lending Act 
applies to this transaction.”  J.A. 283.  The loan agreement 
further informs the borrower that “[o]ur inclusion of any 
disclosures does not mean that Lender consents to the 
application of federal law to any Loan or to this [Loan] 
Agreement.”  J.A. 281. 
 
 Following these disclosures, the loan agreement 
contains twenty-five numbered sections.  One section is titled 
“WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL AND AGREEMENT TO 
ARBITRATE.”  J.A. 289 (capitalization in original).  This 
section of the loan agreement is defined in the contract as “the 
Agreement to Arbitrate.”  Compare J.A. 289 (defining the 
“Waiver of Jury Trial and Agreement to Arbitrate” as the 
“Agreement to Arbitrate”), with J.A. 280 (defining “this loan 
agreement” as the “Agreement” (capitalization omitted)).  We 
refer to this section as the “arbitration agreement.”   
 
 
4 The disclosure also provides that the lender is immune 
from suit in any court, the lender is regulated only by the 
Tribe’s Consumer Finance Services Regulatory Commission, 
and a borrower’s right to submit complaints is limited to the 
dispute resolution process set forth in the loan agreement or to 
the Commission.       
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The arbitration agreement: (1) provides that “any 
dispute you have related to this agreement will be resolved by 
binding arbitration,” J.A. 289 (capitalization omitted); 
(2) defines “[d]ispute” as “any claim or controversy of any 
kind between you and us or otherwise involving this [Loan] 
Agreement or the Loan . . . includ[ing], without limitation, all 
federal, state or Tribal Law claims or demands” and “any issue 
concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of this [Loan] 
Agreement” or arbitration agreement, J.A. 289-90; and 
(3) allows the party requesting arbitration to select either the 
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) or JAMS “for 
initiating and pursuing arbitration,” J.A. 290.   
 
 In a subsection called “APPLICABLE LAW AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATOR’S AWARD,” the 
arbitration agreement states: “THIS [LOAN] AGREEMENT 
SHALL BE GOVERNED BY TRIBAL LAW.”  J.A. 291 
(capitalization in original).  The subsection then specifies that 
“[t]he arbitrator shall apply Tribal Law and the terms of this 
[Loan] Agreement, including [the arbitration agreement].”  
J.A. 291.  The subsection further provides that  
 
[t]he arbitrator shall make written findings and 
the arbitrator’s award may be filed with a Tribal 
court.  The arbitration award shall be supported 
by substantial evidence and must be consistent 
with this [Loan] Agreement and Tribal Law, and 
if it is not, it may be set aside by a Tribal court 
upon judicial review.   
J.A. 291.  The tribal court may confirm an arbitration award 
“only if” the court “determines that the award is supported by 
substantial evidence and is not based on legal error under 
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Tribal Law.”  J.A. 291.   
 
 The arbitration agreement makes numerous other 
references to tribal law: 
 
• “The policies and procedures of the selected arbitration 
firm applicable to consumer transactions will apply 
provided such policies and procedures do not contradict 
this [arbitration agreement] or Tribal Law.”  J.A. 290. 
 
• “Unless prohibited by Tribal Law, the arbitrator may 
award fees, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees to you 
if you substantially prevail in the arbitration.”  J.A. 290. 
 
• “Any arbitration under this [Loan] Agreement may be 
conducted either on Tribal land or within thirty (30) 
miles of your then current residence, at your choice, 
provided that this accommodation for you shall not be 
construed in any way . . . to allow for the application of 
any law other than Tribal Law . . . .”  J.A. 291. 
 
• “The arbitrator has the ability to award all remedies 
available under Tribal Law . . . .”  J.A. 291. 
 
• “As an integral component of accepting this [Loan] 
Agreement, you irrevocably consent to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Tribal courts for purposes of this 
[Loan] Agreement.”  J.A. 291. 
 
• “In the event you opt out of the [arbitration agreement], 
any disputes shall nonetheless be governed under tribal 
law and must be brought within the court system of [the 




Separate from the arbitration agreement is another 
section of the loan agreement, titled 
“ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND CERTIFICATION.”  J.A. 
292 (capitalization in original).  That section also discusses 
both arbitration and tribal law and notifies the borrower that 
“[b]y signing below, you also consent to the dispute resolution 
provision including the provision consenting and limiting 
disputes to tribal law and to tribal courts, to arbitration and to 
the provision not to bring, join or participate in any class 
action.”  J.A. 292. 
 
Another section of the loan agreement, titled 
“GOVERNING LAW,” mentions federal law and its 
application to the loan agreement and the Tribe.  J.A. 292 
(capitalization in original).  It provides, in relevant part:  
 
You understand and agree that this [Loan] 
Agreement is governed only by Tribal Law and 
such federal law as is applicable under the Indian 
Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution . . . . [N]either we nor this [Loan] 
Agreement are subject to any other federal or 
state law or regulation, nor to the jurisdiction of 
any court, unless so stated in this [Loan] 
Agreement . . . . The Lender may choose to 
voluntarily use certain federal laws as guidelines 
for the provision of services.  Such voluntary use 
does not represent acquiescence of the Tribe to 
any federal law unless found expressly 
applicable to the operations of the Tribe. 




The loan agreement also includes a severability clause 
that provides: “If any provision of this [Loan] Agreement is 
held unenforceable, including any provision of the [arbitration 
agreement], the remainder of this [Loan] Agreement shall 
remain in full force and effect.”  J.A. 292. 
B 
 
 Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, 
sued Defendants in federal court, alleging that AWL’s lending 
practices violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and 
various Pennsylvania consumer protection laws.  Defendants 
moved to compel arbitration.     
 
The District Court denied the motion to compel, 
reasoning that: (1) the arbitration agreement was unenforceable 
because the arbitrator is permitted only to consider tribal law 
and, therefore, the arbitrator could not consider any of 
Plaintiffs’ claims as they are based on federal and state law; 
and (2) “a ‘choice of arbitrator’ provision permitting the parties 
to select the AAA or JAMS does not provide an available 
arbitral forum” because it only permitted the arbitrator to apply 
policies and procedures that do not “contradict the agreement 
or ‘Tribal law,’” J.A. 5 (quoting MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., 
883 F.3d 220, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2018)). 
 






“The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce 
covered arbitration agreements according to their terms.”  
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (2019) 
(citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).6  Defendants assert that the District Court 
erred in refusing to compel arbitration because (A) the 
arbitration agreement specifies that the arbitrator will decide 
issues of enforceability and (B) the arbitration agreement’s 
applicable law subsection is not an impermissible prospective 




 We first address who decides whether the arbitration 
agreement is enforceable: the court or the arbitrator.  The 
 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367(a).  We have jurisdiction over appeals from 
orders denying a motion to compel arbitration.  9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(1)(B); In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust 
Litig., 938 F.3d 515, 519 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019).  Our review of 
such orders is plenary, and “we may affirm on any grounds 
supported by the record.”  MacDonald, 883 F.3d at 225 
(quoting Hassen v. Gov’t of V.I., 861 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 
2017)). 
6 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides: “A written provision in . . . a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle 
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part thereof . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.” 
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arbitration agreement provides that “any dispute . . . related to 
this agreement will be resolved by binding arbitration,” J.A. 
289 (capitalization omitted), “includ[ing] any issue concerning 
the . . . enforceability . . . of this [Loan] Agreement” or the 
arbitration agreement, J.A. 290.  Defendants argue that a court 
cannot decide whether the arbitration agreement is 
unenforceable because the agreement delegates such 
enforceability determinations to the arbitrator. 
 “[P]arties may agree to have an arbitrator decide not 
only the merits of a particular dispute but also . . . ‘whether the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate,’” in what is called a 
“delegation clause.”  Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White 
Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019) (quoting Rent-A-Center, 
W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2010)).  The Supreme 
Court explained that “before referring a dispute to an arbitrator, 
the court determines whether a valid arbitration agreement 
exists.  But if a valid agreement exists, and if the agreement 
delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, a court may not 
decide the arbitrability issue.”  Id. at 530 (citation omitted).  In 
accordance with this principle, our Court has held that when an 
agreement contains a clause that delegates to an arbitrator the 
decision whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable, “[a] 
court cannot reach the question of the arbitration agreement’s 
enforceability unless a party challenged the delegation clause 
and the court concludes that the delegation clause is not 
enforceable.”  MacDonald, 883 F.3d at 226.  While a party 
“must ‘challenge the delegation provision specifically,’” id. 
(quoting Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 70, 72) (alteration 
omitted), “a party may rely on the same arguments that it 
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employs to contest the enforceability of other 
arbitration agreement provisions,” id. at 226-27.7 
 Plaintiffs contested the delegation clause in their 
opposition to the motion to compel, and they challenged the 
clause based upon arguments they made concerning the 
enforceability of the entire arbitration agreement.  Pls.’ Opp’n 
to Mot. to Compel at 15, ECF No. 100 (“A contract that 
contains an FAA-prohibited prospective waiver is 
unenforceable in its entirety, delegation clause included . . . . 
As a result, any delegation clause here is unenforceable for the 
same reason the rest of the arbitration contract is 
unenforceable.”).  Because “[t]hese explicit references to the 
delegation clause are sufficient to contest it,” MacDonald, 883 
F.3d at 227, we will proceed to examine Plaintiffs’ 
enforceability arguments. 
 
7 Defendants contend that Henry Schein establishes a 
categorical rule that, when an agreement includes a delegation 
clause, “a court possesses no power to decide the arbitrability 
issue.”  Curry Br. at 24 (quoting Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 
529).  Several appellate courts have rejected similar arguments, 
Gingras, 922 F.3d at 126 n.3; Lloyd’s Syndicate 457 v. 
FloaTEC, L.L.C., 921 F.3d 508, 515 n.4 (5th Cir. 2019), and 
we agree with them.  The question presented in Henry Schein 
was limited to whether courts, even in the face of a delegation 
clause, may “decide the arbitrability question themselves if the 
argument that the arbitration agreement applies to the 
particular dispute is ‘wholly groundless.’”  139 S. Ct. at 527-
28.  Henry Schein “did not change . . . the rule that courts must 
first decide whether an arbitration agreement exists at all.”  
Lloyd’s, 921 F.3d at 515 n.4; see also Gingras, 922 F.3d at 126 
n.3 (stating that Henry Schein did not address “a challenge to 






 Plaintiffs contend that the arbitration agreement, 
including the delegation clause, is unenforceable under the 
prospective waiver doctrine.  The prospective waiver doctrine 
in the arbitration context refers to a situation in which the 
parties agree that, if disputes arise between them, then they 
waive the right to rely on federal law.  The Supreme Court has 
observed that such waivers violate public policy.  E.g., Am. 
Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 (2013).  
Thus, while federal policy favors arbitration, “the Supreme 
Court has . . . made clear that arbitration is only appropriate so 
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or 
her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”  Blair v. 
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 605 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).  
Put differently, while arbitration may be a forum to resolve 
disputes, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 266 
(2009), an agreement to resolve disputes in that forum will be 
enforced only when a litigant can pursue his statutory rights 
there, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).  Accordingly, arbitration 
agreements that limit a party’s substantive claims to those 
under tribal law, and hence forbid federal claims from being 
brought, are unenforceable.  Gingras, 922 F.3d at 117-18; 
Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 856 F.3d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 
2017); Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d 666, 668 (4th 
Cir. 2016); Smith v. W. Sky Fin., LLC, 168 F. Supp. 3d 778, 
785 (E.D. Pa. 2016).8 
 
8 Our Court addressed a similar contract in MacDonald 





 To determine whether the prospective waiver doctrine 
applies, we must identify the law that would apply in 
arbitration under the agreement here, and thus what claims 
Plaintiffs could pursue in arbitration.  To do so, we interpret 
the contract.  We apply the forum’s contract interpretation law, 
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 468 (2015), unless 
the contract has a choice-of-law provision, see Gay v. 
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2007).  Here, the 
applicable law subsection of the arbitration agreement states 
that tribal law applies, and the governing law section of the 
loan agreement states that “this [Loan] Agreement is governed 
only by Tribal Law and such federal law as is applicable under 
the Indian Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.”  J.A. 292.   However, because “the parties have 
not provided the Court with any such [tribal] law” nor have 
they identified any “such federal law as is applicable under the 
Indian Commerce Clause” regarding contract interpretation, 
we will “apply the forum’s contract interpretation principles.”  




Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation.”  883 F.3d at 225.  While 
we held that contract was unenforceable because the arbitral 
forum there was illusory, id. at 232, and it was therefore 
unnecessary to reach the prospective waiver issue, one panel 
member noted that he “would also affirm on the alternative 
ground that the Loan Agreement impermissibly waives a 
borrower’s federal and state statutory rights, thereby rendering 
the arbitration clause unenforceable,” id. at 233 n.15 (citing 




Under the law of the forum, Pennsylvania, we 
determine the meaning of a contract based on the language 
used.9  E.g., Binswanger of Pa., Inc. v. TSG Real Estate LLC, 
217 A.3d 256, 262 (Pa. 2019).  The applicable law subsection 
of the arbitration agreement provides that “[t]he arbitrator shall 
apply Tribal Law and the terms of this [Loan] Agreement, 
including [the arbitration agreement].”  J.A. 291.  That 
subsection further provides that a tribal court may confirm an 
arbitration award “only if” the court “determines that the 
award . . . is not based on legal error under Tribal Law.”  J.A. 
291.  This subsection thus makes clear that tribal law applies 
in arbitration and that the arbitrator’s decision will only be 
sustained if it is supported by tribal law.   
 
Other language in the arbitration agreement also 
demonstrates that the rule of decision in arbitration is tribal 
law.  The arbitration agreement provides that (1) “[t]he 
arbitrator has the ability to award all remedies available under 
Tribal Law,” J.A. 291; (2) “the arbitrator may award fees, 
costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees” “[u]nless prohibited by 
Tribal Law,” J.A. 290; (3) if the parties conduct the arbitration 
off tribal land, the lender’s “accommodation” of that request 
“shall not be construed . . . to allow for the application of any 
law other than Tribal Law,” J.A. 291; and (4) the arbitration 
firm can only apply “policies and procedures” that “do not 
contradict . . . Tribal Law,” J.A. 290.   
 
 
9 Because there is no suggestion that Pennsylvania law 
places arbitration agreements on different “footing” than other 
contracts, use of Pennsylvania law is consistent with the FAA.  
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 468. 
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Finally, and significantly, the acknowledgment and 
certification section of the loan agreement confirms that the 
only claims available in arbitration are tribal-law claims, 
explicitly stating that the borrower “consent[s] to the dispute 
resolution provision including the provision consenting and 
limiting disputes to tribal law and to tribal courts, [and] to 
arbitration.”  J.A. 292.  Thus, the plain language of the 
arbitration agreement and the loan agreement shows that only 




Defendants, nonetheless, contend that borrowers may 
bring claims in arbitration that arise under “such federal law as 
is applicable under the Indian Commerce Clause.”  To make 
this argument, Defendants interpret the arbitration agreement’s 
applicable law subsection to incorporate the term “such federal 
law as is applicable under the Indian Commerce Clause” from 
the governing law section because the applicable law 
subsection states that “[t]he arbitrator shall apply Tribal Law 
and the terms of this [Loan] Agreement,” and the governing 
law section is a term of the loan agreement.  We disagree with 
Defendants’ interpretation for two reasons.  
 
First, “the specific controls the general when 
interpreting a contract.”  Dominic’s Inc. v. Tony’s Famous 
Tomato Pie Bar & Rest., Inc., 214 A.3d 259, 269 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2019) (citation omitted).  Because the arbitration agreement 
specifically directs that tribal law applies in arbitration, with 
no mention of any other body of law, and because the Indian 
Commerce Clause language comes from a separate section in 
the general loan agreement, the arbitration agreement’s 
applicable law subsection is “more likely to reflect the intent 
20 
 
of the parties.”  Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Greenlease Holding Co., 
903 F.3d 333, 350 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Musko v. Musko, 
697 A.2d 255, 256 (Pa. 1997)).  This intent to limit a borrower 
with a dispute to tribal-law claims is apparent in the 
acknowledgement and certification section, which specifically 
states that “[b]y signing [the loan agreement], [the borrower] 
consent[s] to . . . limiting disputes to tribal law.”  J.A. 292.  
This specific reference to the type of disputes that a borrower 
can bring in arbitration controls over the more general 
reference in the governing law section of the loan agreement. 
Second, if we read the phrase “such federal law as is 
applicable under the Indian Commerce Clause” in the context 
in which it appears, it becomes clear that that phrase does not 
provide a separate rule of decision for arbitration.  Khawaja v. 
RE/MAX Cent., 151 A.3d 626, 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) 
(instructing that we consider the context in which a contractual 
phrase appears).  The phrase appears in a section separate from 
the arbitration agreement, titled “GOVERNING LAW.”  J.A. 
292 (capitalization in original).  That section further states that 
“neither we nor this [Loan] Agreement are subject to any other 
federal or state law or regulation,” meaning that the lender and 
loan agreement are subject only to tribal law and some limited 
group of unidentified “federal law as is applicable under the 
Indian Commerce Clause.”  J.A. 292.  Read in its entirety, the 
governing law section, therefore, identifies only the laws to 
which the Tribe and loan agreement are subject.  The laws to 
which the Tribe and loan agreement are subject, however, are 
not the same as what laws can serve as the basis for claims in 
arbitration.10   
 
10 Reading the agreement in any other way would 
introduce an irreconcilable and nullifying conflict within the 
contract, which we must avoid.  Dominic’s, 214 A.3d at 269 
21 
 
The agreement itself reflects this difference.  The 
acknowledgement and certification section of the loan 
agreement, which follows the governing law section, 
specifically states that “[b]y signing below, you also consent to 
the dispute resolution provision including the provision 
consenting and limiting disputes to tribal law and to tribal 
courts, [and] to arbitration[.]”  J.A. 292.  Thus, regardless of 
 
(stating that “clauses in a contract should not be read as 
independent agreements thrown together without 
consideration of their combined effects” so “[t]erms in one 
section of the contract . . . should never be interpreted in a 
manner which nullifies other terms” (citation omitted)); see 
Binswanger, 217 A.3d at 262 (instructing that contracts are not 
to be interpreted “in such a way as to lead to an absurdity or 
make the . . . contract ineffective to accomplish its purpose” 
(citation omitted)).  The arbitration agreement provides that 
“THIS [LOAN] AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY 
TRIBAL LAW,” only tribal-law remedies are available, and 
the arbitrator’s conclusions of law must be consistent with 
tribal law.  J.A. 291 (capitalization in original).  If the 
arbitration agreement’s applicable law subsection implicitly 
incorporates the language from the separate governing law 
section stating that “such federal law as is applicable under the 
Indian Commerce Clause,” then that could nullify the repeated 
and explicit directive that only tribal law applies in arbitration 
and the requirement that a borrower consents to “limiting 
disputes to tribal law.”  J.A. 292.  Thus, we will not interpret 
the arbitration agreement’s directive to consider the loan 
agreement as surreptitiously adopting a separate body of law, 





the law captured by the governing law section, a borrower is 




 Because the arbitration agreement mandates that only 
tribal law applies in arbitration, federal law does not.  As a 
result, the arbitration agreement effects as an impermissible 
prospective waiver of statutory rights.  The Supreme Court has 
said that “a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding 
the assertion of certain statutory rights” renders an arbitration 
agreement unenforceable.  Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236; see 
also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (“[I]n the event the 
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem 
as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory 
remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little 
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public 
policy.”).  While parties may choose what law governs their 
contract or how their arbitration is conducted, DIRECTV, 136 
S. Ct. at 468, “a party may not underhandedly convert a choice 
of law clause into a choice of no law clause,” Hayes, 811 F.3d 
at 675.11  By limiting the claims available to borrowers to 
 
11 Defendants latch onto generalized language in 
Supreme Court cases to argue that parties can categorically 
choose which law applies and what claims can be brought.  
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 468 (“[The FAA] allows parties to an 
arbitration contract considerable latitude to choose what law 
governs some or all of its provisions, including the law 
governing enforceability of a class-arbitration waiver.  In 
principle, they might choose to have portions of their contract 
governed by the law of Tibet, the law of pre-revolutionary 
Russia . . . .” (citation omitted)).  As the Court of Appeals for 
23 
 
tribal-law claims, the arbitration agreement here requires a 
borrower to prospectively waive claims based on any other 
law.  Like our sister circuits, we conclude that this requirement 
violates public policy and renders the arbitration agreement 
unenforceable.  Gingras, 922 F.3d at 117-18; Dillon, 856 F.3d 
at 332; Hayes, 811 F.3d at 668. 
 
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are 
unpersuasive.  First, Defendants argue that for an agreement to 
be invalid under the prospective waiver doctrine, it must 
affirmatively disclaim federal law.  As support for this 
affirmative-disclaimer requirement, Defendants rely on 
language from Supreme Court opinions where the Court 
declined to credit arguments that the arbitrator would not 
entertain federal claims because it was not clear from the 
contracts that the contract waived federal rights.  That is not 
the case here because the arbitration agreement is clear that 
only tribal-law claims are available, and that pronouncement is 
enough to show that federal-law claims are unavailable.  
Gingras, 922 F.3d at 127 (“By applying tribal law only, 
arbitration . . . appears wholly to foreclose [borrowers] from 
vindicating rights granted by federal and state law.”); Dillon, 
856 F.3d at 335-36 (concluding that because the arbitration 
agreement provides “that the arbitrator shall not allow for the 
application of any law other than tribal law,” the 
court “interpret[s] these terms in the arbitration agreement as 
 
the Fourth Circuit explained, parties may choose what law will 
govern an arbitration through a choice-of-law clause (i.e. what 
procedures will be used and what contract interpretation 
principles apply), but a choice-of-law clause cannot forbid 
federal substantive claims from being brought.  Hayes, 811 
F.3d at 675. 
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an unambiguous attempt to apply tribal law to the exclusion of 
federal and state law” (emphasis omitted)). 
 
Second, the individual Defendants assert that the 
arbitration agreement is not an impermissible prospective 
waiver because borrowers can still “vindicate the substance” 
of their RICO claim under tribal law.  Curry Br. at 36 
(emphasis omitted).12  That is, the individual Defendants argue 
that Plaintiffs could bring a RICO-like claim under tribal law 
and receive similar relief.  The Supreme Court, however, has 
framed the prospective waiver question as whether the contract 
effects an “elimination of the right to pursue [a] remedy.”  
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236 (emphasis omitted); see also 
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (“right to pursue statutory 
remedies”); Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 265-66 (“The decision to 
resolve ADEA claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation 
does not waive the statutory right . . . ; it waives only the right 
to seek relief from a court in the first instance.”).  Thus, the 
question is whether a party can bring and effectively pursue the 
federal claim—not whether some other law is a sufficient 
substitute.13  Accordingly, by “flatly and categorically 
 
12 Red Stone does not embrace this argument.    
13 The individual Defendants’ argument that an 
arbitration agreement is not an impermissible prospective 
waiver when parties can vindicate the substance of their federal 
claims under another jurisdiction’s law misconstrues the 
Supreme Court’s precedent.  The Court has explained that an 
arbitration agreement is enforceable “so long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum.”  Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 
at 235 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).  Defendants take 
this “effective vindication” language to mean that a contract 
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renounc[ing] the authority of the federal statutes to which 
[Defendants are] and must remain subject,” the agreement 
takes the “step” “plainly forbidden” by Supreme Court 
precedent.  Hayes, 811 F.3d at 675.  Thus, the arbitration 
agreement contains a forbidden prospective waiver of statutory 
rights. 
 
Finally, even if we interpreted the arbitration agreement 
to allow borrowers to assert claims in arbitration arising under 
“such federal law as is applicable under the Indian Commerce 
Clause,” the agreement still effects a prospective waiver.  
RICO, the federal claim Plaintiffs brought here, is a law passed 
under Congress’ Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clause 
powers.  E.g., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. 
Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 788 n.4 (3d Cir. 1984), abrogated in part 
 
can waive federal rights so long as the applicable law (here, 
tribal law) allows the party to effectively vindicate the 
substance of the federal right.  The Court has never gone so far.  
Rather, the Court has held that a party may waive certain 
procedural guarantees associated with a statutory right (such as 
the ability to proceed as a class action) so long as the party 
retains the right to assert the federal claim.  Id. at 236-37; see 
also Hayes, 811 F.3d at 675 (explaining that Italian Colors 
upheld a class arbitration waiver “because the waiver only 
reduced the economic incentive to bring a federal antitrust 
claim” but, critically, “did not prevent a party from pursuing 
an antitrust claim altogether”).  The Court has not indicated 
that a party can waive the federal right itself.  “In fact, the Court 
stated that the rule against substantive waivers ‘would certainly 
cover a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the 
assertion of certain statutory rights.’”  Hayes, 811 F.3d at 675 
(quoting Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236). 
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on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
557 (2007); United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 
1348 (9th Cir. 1997).  RICO still applies to the Tribe because 
congressional acts of general applicability apply to Indian 
tribes.  Lazore v. C.I.R., 11 F.3d 1180, 1183 (3d Cir. 1993).  
However, as a law passed pursuant to Congress’ foreign and 
interstate commerce powers—not Indian commerce power—it 
is not a “federal law” made “applicable under the Indian 
Commerce Clause.”  As a result, under the loan agreement, 
Plaintiffs could not bring their RICO claim in arbitration even 
under Defendants’ reading, so the loan agreement effects a 
prospective waiver.    
 
 Furthermore, the text of the loan agreement makes clear 
that the phrase “such federal law as is applicable under the 
Indian Commerce Clause” does not capture all federal law or 
even laws of general applicability.  By using the language 
“such federal law as is applicable under the Indian Commerce 
Clause,” the contract conveys a reference to some subset of 
federal laws, which notably Defendants never identified to this 
Court.  Even if that subset had been identified, it would 
demonstrate that at least some federal claims would be excised 
and hence could not be relied upon (for example, RICO).  Our 
interpretation of the clause “such federal law as is applicable 
under the Indian Commerce Clause” as referring to a subset of 
federal law is bolstered by (1) other language in the same 
section that states that the Tribe and the loan agreement are not 
“subject to any other federal or state law or regulation,” J.A. 
292, and (2) several statements in the loan agreement that the 
lender’s voluntary use of federal laws as guidelines “does not 
represent acquiescence of the Tribe to any federal law unless 
found expressly applicable to the operations of the Tribe,” J.A. 
292; see also J.A. 281 (stating that the lender’s use of 
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disclosures “does not mean that Lender consents to the 
application of federal law to any Loan or to this [Loan] 
Agreement”); J.A. 282-83 (stating that disclosures of the type 
contemplated under the Truth in Lending Act do not mean the 
Tribe “concede[s] that the Truth in Lending Act applies to this 
transaction”); J.A. 291 (stating that arbitration conducted off 
tribal land does not “allow for the application of any law other 
than Tribal Law”).  For these reasons, even if the arbitration 
agreement allowed borrowers to bring claims arising under 
“such federal law as is applicable under the Indian Commerce 
Clause,” the agreement would still create an impermissible 




 The prospective waiver of statutory rights renders the 
entire arbitration agreement (delegation clause included) 
unenforceable because the prohibited waiver here is not 
severable.14  “Pennsylvania courts have held that if 
 
14 Even if we analyzed the delegation clause entirely 
separately, we would conclude it is unenforceable.  As one 
district court in this Circuit explained, while the arbitration 
agreement delegates arbitrability determinations to the 
arbitrator, it also provides that the arbitrator can only apply 
tribal law, so 
 
[t]he arbitrator would be expressly forbidden 
from relying on any federal or state law, which 
means that the arbitrator could not ask whether 
the arbitration clause—and its complete 
exclusion of federal law—would violate the 
federal public policy against arbitration clauses 
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an essential term of a contract is deemed illegal, it renders the 
entire contract unenforceable” and cannot be severed.  Spinetti 
v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis 
omitted); see also Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 
A.3d 215, 219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (holding an arbitration 
agreement unenforceable when the invalid term was essential).  
In short, the arbitration agreement’s clear reference to the 
exclusive application of tribal law is intertwined with the 
arbitration process and is central to it.15  As the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit twice held, statements in a loan 
 
that operate as a prospective waiver . . . . Quite 
possibly, the arbitrator would uphold the 
arbitration clause, because there would be no 
principle of federal law standing in the way.  
Enforcing the delegation clause would 
effectively allow [the lender] to subvert federal 
public policy and deny [the borrower] the 
effective vindication of her federal statutory 
rights before the arbitration of her claims even 
began. 
 
Ryan v. Delbert Servs. Corp., No. 5:15-cv-05044, 2016 WL 
4702352, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016) (internal quotation 
marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 
15 Relatedly, the arbitration agreement explicitly states 
that “[a]s an integral component of accepting this [Loan] 
Agreement, you irrevocably consent to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Tribal courts for purposes of this [Loan] 
Agreement.”  J.A. 291.  The arbitration agreement provides 
that the tribal courts will apply tribal law when reviewing 
arbitration awards.  J.A. 291.  Thus, the law the tribal courts 
will apply is also integral to the arbitration agreement. 
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agreement that only tribal law applied in arbitration, and that 
federal law did not apply to the tribe, showed that “one of the 
animating purposes of the arbitration agreement was to ensure 
that [the tribe] and its allies could engage in lending and 
collection practices free from the strictures of any federal law.”  
Hayes, 811 F.3d at 676; see also Dillon, 856 F.3d at 336.  
  
The arbitration agreement here repeatedly states that 
only tribal law claims can be brought in arbitration.  Were we 
to remove the invocations of tribal law in the arbitration 
agreement, we would “impermissibl[y] rewrit[e]” the contract.  
MacDonald, 883 F.3d at 231; accord Dillon, 856 F.3d at 336 
(“[A borrower’s] consent to application of federal law would 
defeat the purpose of the arbitration agreement in its 
entirety.”).  Because tribal law provisions are “integral to the 
entire arbitration agreement,” they “cannot be severed.”16  
MacDonald, 883 F.3d at 232.17  As a result, “the entire 
arbitration agreement, including the delegation clause, is 
unenforceable.”  Id.; see also Gingras, 922 F.3d at 128 
(same).18 
 
16 Of equal import is the Hayes court’s observation that 
“severance should not be used when an agreement represents 
an integrated scheme to contravene public policy.”  811 F.3d 
at 676 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
17 The loan agreement’s severability clause does not 
change our conclusion because a severability clause cannot 
save an arbitration agreement if the invalid provision is integral 
to the agreement.  Stewart, 9 A.3d at 220-21; accord 
MacDonald, 883 F.3d at 231 (collecting cases). 
18 Because we conclude that the prospective waiver of 
statutory rights renders the arbitration agreement 





 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Defendants’ motions to compel 
arbitration. 
 
seek Article III court review of an arbitration award provides a 
separate ground to hold the arbitration agreement 
unenforceable, see Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V 
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995) (noting that a lack of 
“subsequent opportunity for review” at the award-enforcement 
stage could run afoul of public policy); Gingras, 922 F.3d at 
127-28 (holding that an arbitration agreement’s “mechanism of 
tribal court review” was unconscionable), or whether Plaintiffs 
forfeited the argument. 
